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1

INTRODUCTION
This Court correctly determined that Mr. Wardrop is not
entitled to workers' compensation benefits because Utah Code Ann.
§35-1-99(2) (1988) retroactively applies to bar his untimely claim
for medical expenses.

Section 35-1-99(2) cannot be characterized

as substantive merely because it precludes claims for medical
expenses brought after a certain time period.
is a statute of limitations.

Section 35-1-99(2)

It prescribes the legal procedure

for obtaining redress - - n o claimant may pursue the substantive
remedy of medical expenses benefits unless he follows the
procedure of filing a claim within three years after the date of
the accident or the date of the last payment of compensation.
This Court also acted appropriately in reversing the
Industrial Commission's award of temporary total disability
benefits since §35-1-98 (2) (1994) precludes Mr. Wardrop's untimely
claim.

The Industrial Commission is estopped from arguing that

Brown & Root Industrial Service ("Brown & Root") waived its right
to contest the award on appeal.

The Industrial Commission could

have filed an appellee's brief with this Court that raised this
argument, but it chose not to do so.

Now that this Court has

issued an opinion in this case that the Commission deems
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unfavorable, the Commission's after-the-fact protest of waiver
falls on its own sword.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED
THAT §35-1-99(1988) APPLIES RETROACTIVELY
TO BAR MR. WARDROP'S CLAIM FOR MEDICAL EXPENSES.
In determining that §35-1-99(1988) is a procedural statute
with retroactive application, this Court's analysis was simple:
this Court has previously held §35-1-99 to be a statute of
limitations. Brown & Root Industrial Service v. Industrial
Comm'n.. 905 P.2d 305 (Utah App. 1995), citing

Avis v. Board of

Review, 837 P.2d 584, 587 (Utah App., 1992), cert, denied,
P.2d 897 (Utah 1993).

853

Statutes of limitations are considered to

affect only procedural rights and therefore have retroactive
application.

Id. at 307-08, citing

Financial Bancorp, Inc. v.

Pinaree & Dahle. Inc., 880 P.2d 14, 16 (Utah App. 1994).
The Industrial Commission does not deny that §35-1-99(1988)
is a statute of limitations in its Petition for Rehearing.
Neither does it contest that statutes of limitations have been
viewed as procedural under Utah law.

Rather, it contends that

this statute of limitations is substantive because the 1988
amendment decreased the time in which an injured worker could
-2-

bring a claim for medical benefits.

(Petition for Rehearing at

8) .
A statute of limitations does not become substantive merely
because it shortens the time in which a substantive claim must be
brought.

By defining time limits, statutes of limitations set

forth the procedure by which a substantive claim must be
initiated.

In Pan Alaska Trucking, Inc. v. Crouch, 773 P.2d

947(Alaska 1989), the court rejected an injured worker's argument
that a statutory amendment shortening the time in which claimants
must request a hearing with the Workers' Compensation Board,
enacted after the date of injury, was substantive.

The court

applied the amendment retroactively, explaining that:
[the claimant] argues here that because the change in [the
statute] "results in the absence of any effective remedy to
enforce a substantive right," the change should be treated
as substantive. But in deciding whether a change is
substantive in character, it will hardly suffice that a new
rule has proved dispositive in a particular case: if
ignored, nearly any procedural rule can play a role in the
disposition of a case....The claim has faltered on the twoyear limit not because it was a significant obstacle, but
because [the claimant] failed to pay it any heed.
Pan Alaska Trucking, Inc. v. Crouch, 773 P.2d at 949.
Similarly, the court in Harrelson v. Industrial Com'n. of
Arizona, 697 P.2d 1119 (Ariz. App. 1984), considered the
retroactive application of a statutory amendment giving workers'
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compensation claimants one year from the date of injury in which
to file a claim.

While the court observed that retroactive

application would operate to destroy "what previously may have
been a claim of continued vitality/' this did not mean that it
would operate to destroy a vested right.
1123.

Harrelson. 697 P.2d at

The court affirmed the Industrial Commission's dismissal

of the late claim on the ground that the statute was a procedural
law prescribing the method of enforcing substantive rights and
therefore applied retroactively.

Id. at 1122.

See also

Oestreich v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 822 P.2d 1264, 1266
(Wash. App. 1992) (limitations period for making claims for
adjustment of workers' compensation benefits does not eliminate
ability to make claims and applies retroactively).
This Court correctly recognized the procedural, and
therefore retroactive, nature of §35-1-99(1988).

The statute

simply sets forth a time procedure for filing medical expenses
claims; it does not completely destroy a claimant's ability to
seek medical expenses benefits.

Mr. Wardrop's award was properly

reversed for untimeliness.
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POINT II
THE COMMISSION IS ESTOPPED FROM
CLAIMING THAT BROWN & ROOT WAIVED
ITS RIGHT TO APPEAL THE AWARD OF TEMPORARY
TOTAL DISABILITY BENEFITS.

This Court appropriately reversed the Commission's award of
temporary total disability benefits to Mr. Wardrop on the basis
that this claim was untimely under §35-1-98(2).

In its Petition

for Rehearing, the Industrial Commission claims that Brown & Root
contested this award for the first time on appeal.
This Court was free to address the Commission's award of
temporary total disability benefits on appeal, having received no
objection during appellate briefing to this Court's consideration
of the award.

The Commission notes in its Petition for Rehearing

that it received Brown & Root's appellate brief on March 26,
1995.

While the Commission laments that the deadline for filing

a responsive brief had expired by this time, nothing prevented
the Commission from requesting an extension of time in which to
submit an appellee's brief on the ground that it received the
appellant's brief late.

This Court issued its opinion nearly

seven months later, but during that time, the Commission chose
not to file an appellee's brief.
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The Commission had several

months in which to raise its claim that Brown & Root was
contesting the award of temporary total disability benefits for
the first time on appeal, but it elected to remain silent.
The Commission's present protest of waiver comes only after
this Court has issued an opinion in this case that the Commission
views as unfavorable.

The Commission now seeks to reopen the

case and oppose Brown & Root's appeal for the first time, in the
hopes of achieving a more favorable result the second time
around.

The Commission had its chance to claim waiver, and the

opportunity has passed.

It is estopped from raising waiver for

the first time on a Petition for Rehearing.
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF REQUESTED
This Court's opinion in Brown & Root Industrial Service v.
Industrial Comm'n.. is correct in all respects.

In addition to

the arguments presented above in support of this Court's opinion,
Brown & Root incorporates the arguments presented in its
principal brief on appeal.

Brown & Root requests that this Court

deny the Commission's Petition for Rehearing.

Should this Court

grant the Petition for Rehearing, Brown & Root asks that this
Court also consider the second issue raised in Brown & Root's
appeal, which this Court did not reach in light of the
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disposition of the case: whether the Commission should have
submitted to a medical panel the issue of the medical cause of
Mr. Wardrop's present need for knee surgery.
DATED this J?cL

day of January, 1996.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

— T^^fc^rA,
a r t L. Poelman
iilianne P. Blanch
Attorneys for P e t i t i o n e r s
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